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I See London, I See France 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
TO “SAGGY” PANTS LAWS 
In recent years, a number of communities across the 
United States have passed laws against what can only be 
described as a new low: saggy pants. “Saggy” or “baggy” pants, 
the wearing of which is commonly called “sagging,”1 is a style of 
dress characterized by the wearing of pants well below the 
waist, thus exposing underwear and/or flesh to public view.2 
While the style has been around since at least the early 1990s,3 
previous efforts to prohibit saggy pants have focused on 
banning them in the public schools context because of their 
association with urban street gangs.4 Now, however, outraged 
communities have extended the battle to the public streets by 
enacting indecent exposure laws intended to criminalize the 
wearing of saggy pants.5 
However, these ordinances have not been without 
controversy.6 Free speech and civil rights advocates have 
heavily criticized these laws as an infringement upon freedom 
of expression, and potentially motivated by racial bias.7 At least 
  
 1 Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes: Va. Delegate’s Proposal in 2004 
Drew Ridicule, but He Might Have Last Laugh, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 
2008, at A4 [hereinafter Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes]. 
 2 See, e.g., Niko Koppel, Are Your Jeans Sagging? Go Directly to Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at G1; Laura Parker, Cities Snapping Over Baggy Pants, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 15, 2007, at A3. 
 3 Elizabeth Wellington, A Fashion Firestorm over Pants That Sag; New 
Jersey Proposals Target Hip-Hop Style, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1. 
 4 See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 664 
(S.D.Tex. 1997) (challenged school dress code prohibited “gang-related apparel” such as 
“[o]versized apparel, including baggy pants which are worn low on the waist”); Bivens 
v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D.N.M. 1995) (challenged dress code 
prohibited the wearing of sagging pants); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 
F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (challenged school dress code provided that 
“[c]lothes shall be sufficient to conceal undergarments at all times”). 
 5 See infra Part I.B. 
 6 See, e.g., infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
 7 E.g., Koppel, supra note 2, at G1; Greg Lacour, Measure Fails 6-1: ‘Saggy 
Pants’ Proposal Voted Down; Style Won’t Be Banned as Indecent Exposure, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (N.C.), Oct. 17, 2007, at B1 (noting that the main proponent of a proposed 
saggy pants ordinance in Charlotte, N.C., County Commissioner Bill James, had 
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one court has already held a saggy pants ordinance 
unconstitutional,8 although this has not deterred other 
communities from enforcing their own saggy pants laws.9 Even 
President Obama weighed in on the issue during the 2008 
campaign.10 
This Note will explore the constitutional issues raised 
by saggy pants laws, focusing on the two principal 
constitutional rights implicated: the freedom of expression 
protected by the First Amendment11 and the liberty in personal 
appearance protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.12 Part I describes the origins of the 
saggy pants style and the rise of saggy pants ordinances. Part 
II surveys the First Amendment legal landscape in the context 
of expressive conduct, and concludes that despite the stringent 
nature of the Supreme Court’s current governing test for 
distinguishing conduct from speech, saggy pants laws 
impermissibly burden the right to free speech. Part III 
discusses the Due Process Clause jurisprudence regarding 
personal appearance and its application to saggy pants laws, 
arguing that the public’s right to determine matters of personal 
appearance is unconstitutionally infringed by saggy pants 
ordinances. This Note concludes that because of the potential 
difficulty in establishing that wearing saggy pants is 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, the 
more promising avenue for potential litigants may be under the 
Due Process Clause’s protection of individual liberty. 
  
previously expressed a belief that urban blacks live in a “moral sewer,” and quoting an 
opponent of the law who believed the ordinance was motivated by James’ “‘dislike and 
hate for the African American community’”).  
 8 Eliot Kleinberg, Judge Releases Teen, Criticizes Riviera Beach’s Saggy 
Pants Law, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 16, 2008, at B1. 
 9 Steve Neavling, Flint’s Police Chief Shrugs at Fla. Saggy Pants Ruling; 
Law is Unconstitutional, Judge Decides, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 18, 2008, at 5; see 
also infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
 10 Ask Obama (MTV television broadcast Nov. 3, 2008) (“I think passing a 
law about people wearing sagging pants is a waste of time. . . . Having said that, 
brothers should pull up their pants.”); see also Geoff Earle, Kick in Pants from O—
’Brothers, Stop Sagging’, N.Y. POST, Nov. 4, 2008, at 9. 
 11 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 12 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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A few words are necessary to delineate what this Note is 
not: the constitutional analysis herein is of saggy pants laws as 
they apply to a wearer of saggy pants who is not showing any 
flesh whatsoever, but merely has visible undergarments above 
the waistband. The constitutionality of indecent exposure laws 
in the context of actual nudity or visible flesh above the saggy 
pants is beyond the scope of this Note.13 Furthermore, this Note 
does not discuss the potential Equal Protection Clause14 issues 
raised by the enactment of saggy pants laws with a racially 
discriminatory purpose,15 or the enforcement of such laws in a 
racially discriminatory manner,16 as such claims are fact-
sensitive to the context of each particular community. 
I. SAGGY PANTS AND SAGGY PANTS ORDINANCES 
A. Emergence of Saggy Pants 
The practice of sagging began in prisons, which issued 
baggy uniforms without belts in order to deter suicide attempts 
and the use of belts as weapons.17 As prisoners were released, 
the style migrated from the prison population to urban ghettos, 
where it was adopted by street gangs as a means of self-
  
 13 For discussion of these issues, see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 
(2000) (constitutionality of a municipal nudity ban as applied to a nude dancing 
establishment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, (1991) (challenge to a 
public indecency statute applied to nude dancing); DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 
812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987) (male successfully challenged municipal ordinance 
banning shirtless jogging); S. Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 
(11th Cir. 1984) (upholding public indecency statute from First Amendment challenge 
by nude sunbathers).  
 14 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 15 For examples of facially neutral laws invalidated because they were 
enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, see Griffin v. County School Board of 
Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that facially neutral plan to close 
all public schools had racially discriminatory purpose of preventing desegregation) and 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that facially neutral law redefining 
city boundaries had racially discriminatory purpose of disenfranchising African-
Americans). 
 16 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (“Though the law 
itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and 
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as 
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar 
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the Constitution.”). 
 17 Koppel, supra note 2.  
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identification with gang and prison culture.18 Saggy pants were 
in turn adopted by hip-hop artists and rappers,19 many of whom 
were former gang members.20 The ascendancy of hip-hop in the 
popular culture spread sagging into the suburbs and around 
the world.21 Whether characterized as “incarceration chic”22 or a 
“badge of delinquency,”23 saggy pants have clearly been 
embraced by a large subsection of America’s youth.24 This result 
is perhaps unsurprising, given the size and demographics of 
the prison population in the United States,25 the prevalence of 
gang membership and gang violence,26 and the tremendous 
popularity of hip-hop music.27 
  
 18 Guy Trebay, In Jailhouse Chic, an Anti-Style Turns Into a Style Itself, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 2000, at B8 [hereinafter Trebay, In Jailhouse] (discussing the 
influence of prison uniforms on street style). 
 19 Koppel, supra note 2. 
 20 David L. Shabazz, Editorial, Rap Artists’ Thug Images Became Too Real, 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 18, 2005, at A13.  
 21 Guy Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop Seriously. Seriously., N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
2003, at B11 [hereinafter Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop] (noting that “[t]he history of style 
in the late 20th century . . . is substantially the history of hip-hop,” and any survey of 
fashion in the last two decades could not omit the importance of “track suits, sweat 
clothes, wrestling, boxing or soccer shoes, designer sneakers, outsize denims, prison-
style jumpsuits, underwear worn above the trouser waistband, do-rags, cargo pants, 
messenger bags, dreadlocks, cornrows, athletic jerseys, Kangol caps” (emphasis 
added)). 
 22 Trebay, In Jailhouse, supra note 18. 
 23 Koppel, supra note 2 (commenting that “[n]ot since the zoot suit has a style 
been greeted with such strong disapproval,” referring to the outsized suits favored by 
young urban minorities in the 1930’s and 1940’s, which were seen as unpatriotically 
mocking fabric conservation efforts during World War II). 
 24 See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 2; Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop, supra note 21; 
Trebay, In Jailhouse, supra note 18. 
 25 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PUBLICATION 
NCJ 217675, PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 1, 8-9 (2007), available 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf. The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
reports that at midyear 2006 there were 2,245,189 prisoners in custody nationwide, 
including approximately 836,800 black men. Relative to the general population, 1 in 
every 133 U.S. residents is in prison or jail; 4.8% of all black men were in custody, 
compared to about 0.7% of white men and 1.9% of Hispanic men. About 11.7% of all 
black males age 25 to 29 were incarcerated at midyear 2006. 
 26 There are an estimated 21,500 youth gangs in the United States, with 
731,500 gang members. All cities with populations of 250,000 or more reported gang 
problems. NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASSOCIATIONS, 2005 NATIONAL 
GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, at ix (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/ 
what/2005_threat_assesment.pdf. Between 1993 and 2003, perpetrators were identified 
as gang members in about 12% of all aggravated assaults, 4% of rapes, 10% of 
robberies, and 6% of simple assaults. ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PUBLICATION NCJ 208875, VIOLENCE BY GANG MEMBERS, 1993-
2003, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vgm03.pdf.  
 27 In 2004, four of the five nominees for the Grammy Award for Record of the 
Year were hip-hop songs. Sarah Rodman, Rap Hip-Hops to Head of the Grammy Class, 
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 6, 2004, at E4. In October 2003, the top ten songs in the 
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In response to the problem of gang-related school 
violence, many school districts throughout the United States 
have adopted dress codes that ban the wearing of gang-related 
apparel.28 Some states have even granted authority to local 
school boards to mandate school uniforms.29 Dress codes have 
generally withstood constitutional challenge because of the 
important governmental interest in safeguarding the 
educational process and courts’ reluctance to second-guess 
educational policy decisions.30 Perhaps drawing on the success 
of some local communities in banning saggy pants in schools,31 
some state lawmakers attempted to extend these bans to the 
streets.  
B. Saggy Pants Ordinances 
The movement to outlaw saggy pants in public began in 
the state legislatures of Louisiana and Virginia. In 2004, the 
Louisiana legislature voted down a bill that would have made 
it “unlawful for any person to wear clothing in any public place 
or place open to public view which either: (1) Intentionally 
exposes undergarments; or (2) Intentionally exposes any 
portion of the pubic hair, cleft of the buttocks, or genitals,” with 
  
Billboard Hot 100 were all by African-American artists, a first in the history of the 
Billboard charts, “signaling the culmination of hip-hop’s ascent as the dominant force 
in popular music and culture.” Joan Anderman, Hip-Hop Setting the Beat in First, 
Black Artists Hold Billboard’s Top 10, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 2003, at A1. 
 28 See generally Amy Mitchell Wilson, Public School Dress Codes: The 
Constitutional Debate, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 147 (examining the constitutionality of 
school dress codes); Wendy Mahling, Note, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the 
Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 715 (1996). For 
an in-depth analysis of the problems of vagueness and comprehensibility in student 
codes of conduct and suggested guidelines for designing effective and legally defensible 
student discipline rules, see Peter Sansom & Frank Kemerer, It’s All About Rules, 166 
EDUC. LAW REP. 395 (West 2002). 
 29 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(b) (West 2004) (“The governing board of 
any school district may adopt or rescind a reasonable dress code policy that requires 
pupils to wear a schoolwide uniform or prohibits pupils from wearing ‘gang-related 
apparel’ . . . .”). 
 30 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005); Canady v. Bossier 
Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001). But see Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308-11 (8th Cir. 1997) (striking down school regulation 
prohibiting gang symbols without providing any definition of gang); Chalifoux v. New 
Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 667-69 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (striking down a 
dress code provision which banned “gang-related apparel” as overly vague). For a 
discussion of the constitutional rights of students, see infra notes 116-122 and 
accompanying text. 
 31 See Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 559-61 (D.N.M. 
1995). 
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certain exceptions such as “[c]lothing worn in a private 
residence” or “[s]wimming attire worn at a swimming pool or 
beach.”32 Violators would have been subject to three days of 
community service and a maximum fine of $175.33 In 2005, the 
Virginia state legislature considered a bill to outlaw saggy 
pants in public that would have imposed a maximum fine of 
$50 on any person who “intentionally wears and displays his 
below-waist undergarments, intended to cover a person’s 
intimate parts, in a lewd or indecent manner.”34 The bill passed 
the Virginia House, but died in a Senate committee.35 Although 
these bills did not pass, both proposals drew widespread media 
coverage,36 and in the ensuing years several localities have 
enacted their own saggy pants ordinances.  
Louisiana has been at the forefront of the movement to 
outlaw saggy pants, with at least six cities passing such laws in 
recent years.37 For example, the ordinance in Gonzales, 
Louisiana, provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in any public place or in view of 
the public, to intentionally expose his or her genitalia or 
undergarments, or be guilty of any indecent or lewd behavior. 
(1) Any person convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be 
punished by a fine not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00). 
(2) Any person convicted of a second offense of violating the provisions of this 
section shall be punished by a fine not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars 
($150.00). 
(3) Any person convicted of a third offense of violating the provisions shall be 
punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) and up to two 
(2) eight-hour days of community service or trash abatement.38 
Other Louisiana cities even provide for the possibility of 
jail time for violators of their saggy pants ordinances.39 For 
  
 32 H.B. 1703, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2004). The legislative history and 
voting results can be found at http://legis.state.la.us.  
 33 Id.  
 34 H.B. 1981, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005). 
 35 Christina Bellantoni, Senators Drop “Droopy Drawers”; Bill Had Made 
State a Global Joke, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at B1. 
 36 See, e.g., Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes, supra note 1 (noting 
that “[m]edia outlets from around the world descended on Richmond”); Bellantoni, 
supra note 35, at B1 (noting that the Virginia legislation made headlines “in 
newspapers as far away as Australia,” and that the Louisiana bill was the subject of a 
parody on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart). 
 37 Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes, supra note 1. 
 38 GONZALES, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-145 (2007), available at 
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=10845&sid=18. 
2009] I SEE LONDON, I SEE FRANCE 673 
example, the law in Abbeville, Louisiana, allows for up to six 
months’ imprisonment: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in a public place or in view of the 
public to wear pants or a skirt in such a manner as to expose their 
underlying garments. 
Any person violating this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be 
fined not more than three hundred dollars ($300.00) or imprisoned 
for not more than six (6) months, or both.40 
The movement to outlaw saggy pants has spread well 
beyond Louisiana.41 Similar laws have been enacted in Pine 
Lawn, Missouri;42 Hawkinsville, Georgia;43 Lynwood, Illinois;44 
and Riviera Beach, Florida.45 In Flint, Michigan, the police chief 
has announced his intention to apply existing disorderly 
conduct laws against those who wear saggy pants.46 Other cities 
  
 39 See, e.g., ABBEVILLE, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-25 (2008), available at 
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=10339&sid=18; Koppel, supra note 
2 (discussing ordinance in Mansfield, Louisiana, which allows for up to fifteen days’ 
imprisonment); Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes, supra note 1 (discussing 
ordinance in Delcambre, Louisiana, providing for up to six months of jail time). 
 40 ABBEVILLE, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-25 (2007).  
 41 Other Louisiana cities enacting such laws include Shreveport, Port Allen, 
Alexandria, Donaldsonville, and Baker. SHREVEPORT, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 50-
167 (2007), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp? 
pid=10151&sid=18 (maximum fine of $250 and four days of community service); PORT 
ALLEN, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-13 (2007), available at 
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=10009&sid=18 (maximum fine 
of $500); ALEXANDRIA, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-128 (2007), available at 
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=11767&sid=18 (penalizing the 
parent or legal guardian of any juvenile cited for a violation with fines of up to $200, up 
to forty hours community service, and even mandatory attendance by both parent and 
child at a family counseling program; adults subject to same penalties for their own 
violations); Samuel Irwin, Deputies to Begin ‘Saggy’ Warnings, BATON ROUGE 
ADVOCATE, March 13, 2008, at B4, available at http://www.2theadvocate.com/ 
news/16632621.html (describing Donaldsonville ordinance); Marilyn Goff, Baker 
Council Votes to Ban Sagging Pants, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Oct. 29, 2008, at B2, 
available at http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/33486334.html (describing Baker 
ordinance; maximum fine of $250 and four days of community service). 
 42 Denise Hollinshed, Baggy Pants Ban Is Working, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2008 [hereinafter Hollinshed, Baggy Pants]. 
 43 Jennifer Burk, No One Yet Tagged for Too Much Sag in Hawkinsville, 
MACON TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Nov. 27, 2007, at B. 
 44 William Lee, Village Cracks Down on Exposed Undies, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at 18. 
 45 Dianna Cahn, Riviera Beach Police Enforcing Fashion Law; 
Constitutionality of the Saggy Pants Law is Being Questioned, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 8, 2008, at B1. This law was later held unconstitutional “based on the 
limited facts of this case” by Palm Beach County Circuit Judge Paul Moyle in one of the 
first lawsuits challenging such laws. Kleinberg, supra note 8. 
 46 Bryn Mickle, ACLU: Fla. Ruling Cuts Holes in Flint’s Low-Pants Ban, 
FLINT J. (Mich.), Sept. 18, 2008, at A1. 
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considering the adoption of their own saggy pants ordinances 
include: Baltimore, Maryland;47 Trenton and Pleasantville, New 
Jersey;48 Bel-Ridge and Moline Acres, Missouri;49 Duncan, 
Oklahoma;50 Yonkers, New York;51 Gardena, California;52 and 
Atlanta,53 Rome, Brunswick and Plains, Georgia.54 Proposals for 
such ordinances have been defeated or withdrawn in Charlotte, 
North Carolina;55 Dallas, Texas;56 Natchitoches, Louisiana;57 
Stratford, Connecticut;58 Midlothian, Illinois;59 and Pine Bluff, 
Arkansas.60  
Local police enforcement of these laws has varied so far. 
Some municipalities have stringently enforced their 
ordinances. For example, in Pine Lawn, Missouri, the police 
have issued at least seventeen citations since their saggy pants 
ordinance went into effect.61 In Riviera Beach, Florida, one teen 
spent a night in jail after being spotted riding a bicycle with 
exposed boxers,62 while at least four other violators have been 
arrested under the law.63 Other cities have taken a more 
conservative approach, issuing only verbal warnings to 
violators. Law enforcement officials in Donaldsonville, 
Louisiana, told the city council that enforcement of the new 
ordinance would begin with “verbal and written warnings.”64 
Similarly, the police in Hawkinsville, Georgia, have merely 
  
 47 Tanika White, Pants Proposition: The City Council Is Urged to Take a Stand 
Against Trousers That Expose Underwear, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 19, 2007, at A1. 
 48 Wellington, supra note 3. 
 49 Hollinshed, Baggy Pants, supra note 42. 
 50 Parker, supra note 2.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Gardena Council Considers Ban on Saggy Pants, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 
24, 2008. 
 53 David Pendered, Atlanta Bill Would Outlaw Public Show of Underwear, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 23, 2007, at A1. 
 54 Parker, supra note 2. 
 55 Lacour, supra note 7. 
 56 Mike Lee, Fort Worth Officials Look to Join Pants-Raising Effort, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Tex.), Sept. 24, 2008. 
 57 Parker, supra note 2. 
 58 Thomas Kaplan, A Connecticut Town Debates the Need for a Kind of Belt-
Tightening, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at B5. 
 59 William Lee, Midlothian Won’t Prohibit Baggy Pants, SOUTHTOWN STAR 
(Chicago, Ill.), Oct. 9, 2008, at 10. 
 60 Pine Bluff Councilman Withdraws Proposed Ban on Saggy Pants, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2007. 
 61 Hollinshed, Baggy Pants, supra note 42. 
 62 Kleinberg, supra note 8. 
 63 Cahn, supra note 45.  
 64 Deputies to Begin ‘Saggy’ Warnings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 13, 2008. 
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warned violators as part of a public information campaign to 
create awareness of the new law.65 In Flint, Michigan, police are 
attempting to introduce offenders to diversionary programs 
such as the Police Activities League or community groups like 
neighborhood block associations instead of making arrests.66 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has 
fought back against such laws, speaking out against their 
constitutionality and threatening legal action against cities 
with saggy pants ordinances. An organizer with the ACLU of 
Georgia said the group would “certainly challenge” any saggy 
pants ordinance approved by the city of Atlanta.67 In July 2008, 
the ACLU of Michigan submitted a letter to the police chief of 
Flint, Michigan, calling the city’s practice of classifying sagging 
as disorderly conduct “a blatant violation of the United States 
Constitution” and asking him to “halt this practice 
immediately.”68 In addition, the ACLU of Michigan has offered 
legal assistance to anyone charged under the Flint ordinance.69 
While the Flint police have yet to arrest anyone for sagging, 
the Flint police chief has ignored the ACLU’s request to change 
his policy.70 
Such threats of legal action appear to have been taken 
seriously in at least a few cities. In Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the 
mayor persuaded the city council to reject a saggy pants 
ordinance, citing the potential expense of defending lawsuits 
challenging the law.71 The Arkansas chapter of the ACLU had 
expressed opposition to the proposed ordinance.72 After the 
ACLU of Eastern Missouri achieved the dismissal of a Pine 
Lawn, Missouri resident’s ticket for violating the saggy pants 
ordinance, city officials met with ACLU representatives and 
are now considering scrapping their ordinance.73 Pine Lawn’s 
police chief said the ACLU “want[s] to have an extensive law 
  
 65 Burk, supra note 43. 
 66 Mickle, supra note 46. 
 67 Eric Stirgus, Critics Say Ban on Saggy Pants a Racial Trigger, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Jan. 17, 2008, at B5. 
 68 Ben Schmitt & Michele Munz, Saggy-Pants Suit? Chief Will Press on 
Pants, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 21, 2008, at A3. 
 69 Ben Schmitt, ACLU Prepares to Take Cops to Court over Saggy Pants, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 21, 2008, available at 2008 WL 13617585. 
 70 Mickle, supra note 46. 
 71 Parker, supra note 2. 
 72 Pine Bluff Councilman Withdraws Proposed Ban on Saggy Pants, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2007. 
 73 Denise Hollinshed, Pine Lawn May Scrap Prohibition on Wearing Droopy 
Pants, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2008 [hereinafter Hollinshed, Pine Lawn]. 
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battle, and the mayor called a meeting saying we are not going 
to spend that kind of money fighting it unless we get a pool of 
money from some other people to help us fight it.”74 Such a fight 
would implicate two constitutional rights, and is the subject of 
Parts II and III.  
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FASHION 
Because the wearing of saggy pants may be considered a 
form of speech, saggy pants laws implicate the First 
Amendment’s protection of an individual’s right to free speech.75 
Part II discusses the case law pertinent to the application of 
free speech rights in the context of laws banning saggy pants, 
and concludes that these laws impermissibly infringe upon the 
citizenry’s right to free expression. 
A. Freedom of Speech and Expressive Conduct 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”76 Although 
sagging is undoubtedly conduct, the Supreme Court has long 
established that the First Amendment protects symbolic speech 
and expressive conduct, as well as written and spoken speech.77 
Thus, the threshold inquiry in any expressive conduct claim is 
whether the conduct at issue is speech entitled to protection by 
the First Amendment.78  
  
 74 Id.  
 75 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) (recognizing a parade as “a form of expression”); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that the burning of an American flag 
outside the Republican National Convention was expressive conduct protected by the 
First Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (holding that an 
American flag displayed outside a window with a peace symbol affixed to it was 
protected expression); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
505-06 (1969) (recognizing that the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam 
War was protected speech); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) 
(holding a state prohibition on displaying a red flag as a “sign, symbol or emblem of 
opposition to organized government” unconstitutional). 
 78 Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (“To be sure, appellant did not choose to articulate 
his views through printed or spoken words. It is therefore necessary to determine 
whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall 
within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .”). 
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In Spence v. Washington, a college student was arrested 
for hanging an American flag upside down outside his window 
with a large peace sign made out of black removable tape 
affixed to both sides.79 Spence was charged with violating 
Washington’s law against improper flag use, which 
criminalized affixing words or symbols to the American flag.80 
The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that 
Spence’s act was protected symbolic speech.81 In so doing, the 
Court delineated a two-part test for determining whether 
speech or conduct is expressive: whether “[a]n intent to convey 
a particularized message was present, and [whether] in the 
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”82 
Simply overcoming the Spence test and establishing 
that the conduct at issue is protected speech does not mean 
that the conduct is immune from government regulation. First 
Amendment rights are not absolute, and the government may 
regulate speech provided it has a sufficient subordinating 
justification.83 For example, the Supreme Court has long upheld 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in 
public forums such as streets and parks.84 However, such 
restrictions cannot be based on the content of the speech. 
“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”85  
  
 79 Id. at 406. 
 80 Id. at 406-07. 
 81 Id. at 406. 
 82 Id. at 410-11. The Spence Court did not expressly pronounce this language 
as a two-part test, but the Supreme Court has since cited Spence for this proposition. 
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular 
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment 
into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood 
by those who viewed it.’”). 
 83 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) 
(“[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments, are ‘absolutes’” (citation omitted)); Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic.”).  
 84 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984) (“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.”). 
 85 Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971); see also Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
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This distinction between content-based86 and content-
neutral87 restrictions on speech is a crucial one in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Content-based regulations are 
“presumptively invalid”88 because “[g]overnment action that 
stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the 
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, 
contravenes this essential right [of free speech].”89 Content-
based regulations are met with strict scrutiny by the courts, 
meaning that they will be upheld only if the government can 
show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.90 
In contrast, content-neutral laws of general applicability to 
speakers regardless of the viewpoint expressed or the subject 
matter of the speech are given intermediate scrutiny when 
challenged.91  
Where protected expressive conduct is prohibited by a 
content-neutral law regulating conduct, courts use the 
intermediate scrutiny test announced by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. O’Brien.92 In O’Brien, four individuals burned 
their draft cards on the steps of a courthouse to protest the 
Vietnam War.93 David Paul O’Brien was convicted of violating a 
federal law that made it a crime to “knowingly destroy” or 
“knowingly mutilate” draft registration certificates.94 The Court 
said that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are 
  
 86 For examples of content-based laws, see Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2001) (code of judicial conduct barred judges and candidates 
for judicial office from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political 
issues”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (District of Columbia ordinance 
prohibited the display of signs outside foreign embassies which would tend to bring 
that foreign government into “public odium” or “public disrepute”); and Mosley, 408 
U.S. at 92-93 (disorderly conduct ordinance barred picketing outside schools but 
exempted “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute”). 
 87 For examples of content-neutral laws, see Clark v. Community for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 290 (National Park Service regulation permitted camping in 
national parks only if there was a campground designated for that purpose); City 
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 791-92 (1984) (municipal 
code prohibited the posting of signs on public property); and Heffron v. International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1981) (state fair rules 
prohibited the sale or distribution of merchandise or literature except from booths 
rented “in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis”).  
 88 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 89 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 90 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321-22; Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). 
 91 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642. 
 92 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 93 Id. at 369-70. 
 94 Id.  
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combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech 
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms.”95 The Court then articulated the test for evaluating 
cases where expressive conduct is outlawed by a government 
regulation:  
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if [1] it is within 
the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.96 
Using this standard, the Court upheld O’Brien’s conviction, 
finding that the government’s interest in preserving draft cards 
had justifications unrelated to suppression of speech, such as 
expediting military mobilization in a national emergency.97 
The third prong of the O’Brien test performs what has 
been called a “critical switching function” at the outset of any 
review of a purportedly content-neutral law regulating 
expressive conduct.98 A law will be deemed content-neutral and 
thus subject to O’Brien’s more lenient intermediate scrutiny 
only if the asserted government interest behind the law is 
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”99 Where the 
state interest is related to the suppression of free expression, 
the court will apply strict scrutiny, and not the O’Brien test. As 
a result, such laws will only be upheld if they are necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.100 
  
 95 Id. at 376. 
 96 Id. at 377. The Court later clarified that while a content-neutral law “must 
be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral 
interests[,] . . . it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.” 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 97 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-80. 
 98 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 952 
(16th ed. 2007). 
 99 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 567-72 (1991) 
(plurality opinion) (applying O’Brien test and upholding content-neutral public 
indecency statute as applied to nude dancing).  
 100 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (stating that “we have 
limited the applicability of O’Brien’s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which 
‘the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression’”). 
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B. Applying the First Amendment to Saggy Pants 
Ordinances 
In light of the foregoing, whether a saggy pants 
ordinance violates protected free speech rights under the First 
Amendment will depend upon: 1) whether the practice of 
sagging is deemed to be expressive conduct;101 2) whether the 
asserted government interest in outlawing saggy pants is 
related to the suppression of free expression;102 and 3) the 
importance of the governmental interests set forth as 
justification for the ordinance.103 If sagging is not expressive 
conduct, the First Amendment is wholly inapplicable and offers 
no protection to the violator. If the wearing of saggy pants is 
deemed expressive conduct, the court must determine whether 
the ordinance is content-based, thus requiring the government 
to satisfy strict scrutiny, or content-neutral, thereby requiring 
the ordinance to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the 
O’Brien test. Because the wearing of clothes communicates 
aspects of the wearer’s identity and the government interest in 
regulating the citizenry’s fashion choices is negligible, saggy 
pants ordinances unconstitutionally infringe upon First 
Amendment rights.  
1. The Problems of Particularity 
In Bivens v. Albuquerque Public Schools, a federal court 
in the District of New Mexico considered a free speech 
challenge to a school dress code that prohibited sagging.104 A 
student was suspended for repeatedly violating the dress code, 
which was adopted in response to a gang problem at the high 
school.105 The Bivens court determined that the student 
intended to convey a particularized message, thus satisfying 
the first prong of the Spence test106 to establish non-verbal 
conduct as protected symbolic speech.107 The message was that 
“sagging pants are a way for him to identify and express his 
link with his black identity, the black culture and the styles of 
  
 101 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. 
 102 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
 103 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
 104 Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 (D.N.M. 1995). 
 105 Id. at 558. 
 106 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974). 
 107 Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 560-61 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 
(1989)). Johnson, in turn, cites Spence. See supra note 82. 
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urban black youth.”108 However, the court rejected the First 
Amendment claim because of a failure to establish that “there 
is a great likelihood that those who observe this expressive 
conduct will understand the message.”109 The student had made 
only conclusory assertions that others would understand the 
message, while the school had submitted evidence in the form 
of affidavits that any message conveyed by wearing saggy 
pants was not apparent to viewers.110 The court noted that 
sagging was understood by some as demonstrating gang 
affiliation, by others as showing a desire to become gang 
members, and by still others as a fashion trend followed by 
many adolescents.111 Because the student had failed to 
introduce exhibits or affidavits to carry his burden of 
demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial, the school’s 
motion for summary judgment was granted.112 
Bivens, while illustrative of the perils of summary 
judgment for a plaintiff with no evidence in support of factual 
allegations, does not provide a conclusive answer to the 
question of whether sagging is expressive conduct.113 Moreover, 
the Bivens court had no incentive to find a triable issue of fact 
on the question, as it indicated it would likely find for the 
school even if sagging was speech.114 The court noted: 
Even if the wearing of sagging pants could be construed as protected 
speech, I would have grave doubts about the merits of Plaintiff’s 
claim. . . . Defendants have made a strong showing . . . that the dress 
code adopted at [the school] was a reasonable response to the 
perceived problem of gangs within the school. . . . [T]he dress code 
may have been responsible for the perception of an improved climate 
and learning environment at the school.115 
Thus, the outcome in Bivens can be explained by the 
fact that the dispute arose in the public schools, a context 
where great deference is given to the government’s interest in 
maintaining the orderly administration of an inculcative 
  
 108 Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 560-61. 
 109 Id. at 561. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the moving party is entitled 
to summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C). See Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986). 
 113 See infra notes 125-168 and accompanying text. 
 114 Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 561 n.9. 
 115 Id. 
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education.116 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held 
that while students do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”117 the 
“special characteristics of the school environment” allow for 
restrictions on student expression that would be 
unconstitutional if the government were to make similar 
restrictions on society at large.118 Accordingly, a school may 
prohibit speech that is “inconsistent with its basic educational 
mission” if the speech would “substantially interfere with the 
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.”119 For example, the Supreme Court has upheld 
disciplining a student for giving a lewd speech at a school 
assembly120 or displaying a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” at a school-sponsored trip to watch the Olympic torch 
pass through Juneau, Alaska.121 However, the Court has 
guarded against suppression of unpopular or controversial 
student speech out of the mere fear of a disturbance, such as 
the wearing of black armbands by students to express 
opposition to the Vietnam War.122 Because the Bivens court 
dealt with a school dress code targeting the school’s gang 
problem,123 and gang violence interferes with the work of a 
school, the school’s eventual victory was inevitable. 
Furthermore, Spence’s dual requirements of a 
“particularized message” and understandability124 are 
themselves fluid concepts in the case law.125 The Supreme Court 
has on several occasions found expressive conduct to be 
protected speech without conducting any searching inquiry into 
the particular message intended by conduct, or requiring the 
message to be clearly understandable. For example, in Barnes 
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., a case upholding a local ordinance 
proscribing public nudity from First Amendment challenge, the 
court held that nude dancing behind a glass panel in a coin-
operated booth in an adult bookstore “is expressive conduct 
  
 116 Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-86 (1986). 
 117 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 118 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
 119 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 120 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 121 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401-03 (2007). 
 122 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-10. 
 123 Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D.N.M. 1995). 
 124 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
 125 See infra notes 126-148 and accompanying text. 
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within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”126 The 
only “message” the Court referred to was “the erotic message 
conveyed by the dancers,” and noted that “the requirement that 
the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not deprive the 
dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes 
the message slightly less graphic.”127 Such a vague “erotic 
message” would hardly seem to be “particularized.” 
More recently, the Court cast doubt upon the 
requirements of particularity and understandability in Hurley 
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, a 
case upholding the right of private parade organizers to 
exclude a group expressing a message contrary to the parade 
organizers’ choosing.128 A unanimous Supreme Court explicitly 
disclaimed any requirement that expression be susceptible to a 
particularized understanding for it to be protected speech: “[A] 
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ [citing Spence129] would 
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”130 This language is unarguably in tension with 
Spence and calls into question the Spence test’s131 continuing 
validity. The Court went on to note that “a private speaker 
does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining 
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate 
an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the 
speech.”132 In addition to these examples, the Supreme Court 
has on many occasions proclaimed art as protected speech, 
even though, as Hurley recognizes, art is not always susceptible 
to a “particularized message” analysis.133 
The problems of the “particularized message” approach 
to determining First Amendment protections in the context of 
clothing regulations are illustrated by Chalifoux v. New Caney 
  
 126 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 127 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570-71 (plurality opinion). 
 128 515 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1995). 
 129 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
 130 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
 131 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
 132 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70. 
 133 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973) (“[I]n the area of 
freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to any 
infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression.”). 
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Independent School District.134 In Chalifoux, school officials 
enforcing the school’s ban on “gang-related” apparel prevented 
two students from wearing rosaries as necklaces.135 The 
students brought a free speech suit, claiming that they wore 
the rosary “with the intent to communicate their Catholic faith 
to others.”136 The school district’s defense was similar to that of 
the Albuquerque schools in Bivens:137 even if the students 
sincerely intended to communicate a message, their conduct 
failed the Spence test138 because many non-Catholics are 
unfamiliar with the rosary and even those familiar with a 
rosary would not understand the message because the rosary is 
commonly used as an aid to prayer, rather than as a necklace.139 
The district court rejected that argument in finding for the 
students: 
Defendants read Plaintiffs’ religious message too narrowly. Even 
assuming that some persons are not familiar with the rosary, 
undoubtedly they are familiar with the crucifix attached to the 
center of the rosary, which is recognized universally as a symbol of 
Christianity. Accordingly, there is a great likelihood that those 
persons unable to associate Plaintiffs’ rosaries with Catholicism 
nevertheless, will understand that Plaintiffs are Christians. 
Moreover, the evidence at trial showed that wearing a rosary as a 
necklace is not so abnormal that persons familiar with the rosary 
would be unlikely to understand Plaintiffs’ religious message. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the symbolic speech at issue in this 
case is a form of religious expression protected under the First 
Amendment.140 
Thus, the Chalifoux court hews toward Hurley in 
refusing to adopt a strict requirement of understandability,141 
thereby implicitly rejecting the Spence142 test. The Chalifoux 
court conceptualized the “particular message” as “I am a 
Christian,” not “I am a proud Catholic,” and said the message 
was understandable even though the rosary was being worn as 
  
 134 976 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D. Tex. 1997). For an in-depth treatment of 
Chalifoux and the problems of school dress codes targeted at gang apparel, see 
Christopher M. LaVigne, Comment, Bloods, Crips, and Christians: Fighting Gangs or 
Fighting the First Amendment?, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 389 (1999). 
 135 Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 663. 
 136 Id. at 659, 665. 
 137 Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (D.N.M. 1995). 
 138 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). 
 139 Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 665. 
 140 Id at 665. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
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a necklace, a somewhat unconventional way of using a prayer 
aid.143 By adopting a broad reading of the “particular message” 
in the speech at issue, the court imported an expansive, 
inclusive generality into a test144 looking for a “particular 
message.”  
This broad conception of understandability is an 
entirely correct result, since by its very nature symbolic 
conduct frequently does not lend itself to a “particularized 
message.”145 For example, the burning of an American flag 
outside the 1984 Republican National Convention was held by 
the Supreme Court to be protected expressive conduct,146 but 
there was not necessarily a great likelihood that a “particular” 
message would be understood by those who viewed it, as the 
Spence test147 requires. A bystander might easily have viewed 
the message as “Down with Reagan,” “Down with Republicans,” 
or even “Down with America.” In Spence itself, where 
displaying an upside-down American flag with a peace sign 
affixed to it was protected expressive conduct,148 the casual 
viewer might discern a meaning differing from the intended 
message. Spence “wanted people to know that [he] thought 
America stood for peace,” and meant to protest the recent 
invasion of Cambodia and the student deaths at Kent State 
University.149 However, the distinction between such varying 
messages as “For Peace in Vietnam” and “America Should 
Generally Pursue a Pacifist Foreign Policy” isn’t readily 
apparent from the mere viewing of Spence’s flag. These 
examples underscore that a strict requirement of a readily 
understandable “particularized message” would fail to protect 
even inarguably expressive conduct.  
Expressive conduct is not truly protected by the First 
Amendment if it is only protected to the extent that it conveys a 
particularized message easily understood by the population at 
large. The symbolic conduct cases stand for the recognition that 
  
 143 Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 665. 
 144 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
 145 Cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009) 
(rejecting the idea that a city’s display of the Ten Commandments necessarily imparts 
a religious message: “Even when a monument features the written word, the 
monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by 
different observers, in a variety of ways. . . . [I]t frequently is not possible to identify a 
single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure . . . .”). 
 146 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 147 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
 148 Id. at 410. 
 149 Id. at 408. 
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some conduct is protected free speech, despite the fact that 
conduct, by its very nature, cannot have the particularity and 
understandability made possible by the written and spoken word. 
2. Is Sagging Expressive Conduct? 
If expressive conduct proclaiming “I am a Christian”150 
and “For Peace in Vietnam”151 is to be given protected status 
under the First Amendment, there is no principled way to 
distinguish clothing imparting a similar message. In other 
words, the particular type of conduct at issue should not 
matter, as long as the conduct communicates a message. If 
Spence’s peace-sign-on-American-flag symbol were instead 
printed on a t-shirt, the result should be the same. So the 
question is whether the conduct of wearing clothing such as 
saggy pants is expressive.  
Despite the potential hazards of a strictly applied 
Spence test,152 potential litigants can make a straightforward 
case that wearing saggy pants is expressive conduct. Among 
the most common forms of communication utilized by humanity 
on a daily basis is the medium of clothing and personal 
appearance. As Gowri Ramachandran has noted in an 
influential article, our personal appearance imparts a message 
to the great majority of silent passersby: it is a means by which 
we define and communicate aspects of our identity.153 Personal 
appearance is a kind of performance,154 and fashion is a kind of 
language.155 Through our clothes, we communicate such things 
as our race, gender, sexual orientation, class, occupation, and 
membership in other identity categories and subcultures.156 
Thus, the UPS deliveryman’s uniform imparts a message 
concerning his place of employment and reason for ringing the 
  
 150 See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (discussing Chalifoux v. 
New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997)).  
 151 See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408 (1974)). 
 152 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
 153 See generally Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private 
Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. 
REV. 11 (2006). 
 154 Id. at 18-26. 
 155 Id. at 46. 
 156 Id. at 19, 41. But see City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 US 19, 25 (1989) (“It is 
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-
for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall-but 
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”). 
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doorbell. This is understood by the intended recipient, who 
opens the door. The police officer’s uniform identifies her to the 
public as a police officer and may deter crime. In turn, the 
public may seek out the officer’s help, all without the need for a 
redundant sign declaring “I am a police officer.” The 
conservative suit of a lawyer or politician is intended to 
communicate professionalism, trustworthiness, and 
seriousness of purpose. Peyton Manning’s receivers need no 
sign advertising their employment with the Indianapolis Colts 
football franchise. The homeless person’s poverty is usually 
heartbreakingly obvious without a spoken word. The upper-
class fashionista may easily convey her class and interest in 
high fashion through Manolo Blahnik shoes and an Hermès 
handbag. 
Appearances matter. To deny that fashion is speech and 
argue that clothes are purchased and worn based on mere 
comfort and price considerations is to ignore human 
experience. The fashion, advertising, and other industries 
ranging from hairdressing to image consulting are predicated 
upon the notion that personal appearance imparts a message. 
It is self-evident that stiletto heels and neckties are not the 
most comfortable clothing options; if speech were not part of 
personal appearance, we would wear sweat suits or jeans to all 
occasions. If all fashion is speech, it follows a priori that the 
wearing of saggy pants is also speech. 
Furthermore, sagging indeed expresses a particularized 
message. As previously noted,157 the style was originally 
adopted by inner city African-Americans to express 
identification with urban gang and prison culture.158 The style 
subsequently was adopted by hip-hop music artists.159 The 
broad popularity of hip-hop has spread the style to the genre’s 
adherents.160 Thus, the wearing of sagging pants communicates 
identification with the hip-hop music subculture or an 
  
 157 See supra notes 17-18. 
 158 Trebay, In Jailhouse, supra note 18 (discussing the influence of prison 
uniforms on street style). 
 159 Neil Strauss, For Every Beat There Is a Fashion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, 
at 39. 
 160 Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop, supra note 21 (noting that “[t]he history of style 
in the late 20th century … is substantially the history of hip-hop,” and any survey of 
fashion in the last two decades could not omit the importance of “track suits, sweat 
clothes, wrestling, boxing or soccer shoes, designer sneakers, outsize denims, prison-
style jumpsuits, underwear worn above the trouser waistband, do-rags, cargo pants, 
messenger bags, dreadlocks, cornrows, athletic jerseys, Kangol caps”) (emphasis 
added). 
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affiliation with urban gang culture, or both. As the Bivens court 
put it, saggy pants express a “link with [one’s] black identity, 
the black culture and the styles of black urban youth.”161 As 
discussed in Part II.B.1., supra, the Spence test has proved to 
be an elastic concept and is in tension with other Supreme 
Court cases protecting speech with no readily understandable 
“particularized message,” if not the facts of Spence itself. As the 
Supreme Court said in Hurley, “a narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection”.162 If “I 
am for peace in Vietnam”163 or “I am a Christian”164 is particular 
enough for First Amendment protection, “I am a hip-hop fan” 
or “I am an African-American youth” should also suffice.  
Moreover, any government defense that saggy pants are 
not expressive conduct is at odds with the government 
approach to preventing gang violence. Many school districts 
ban “gang-related” apparel, which may include saggy pants, 
under dress codes designed to reduce gang violence.165 At least 
one city has enacted a local ordinance prohibiting the wearing 
of “known gang colors, emblems, or other insignia.”166 One 
county in New Mexico authorized the police to exclude 
members of the public wearing backwards hats under a “zero 
tolerance” approach to gang activity at the county fair.167 In the 
law of criminal procedure, saggy pants are part of the totality 
of the circumstances which may arouse a reasonable suspicion 
that a member of the public may pose a safety threat, thus 
  
 161 Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (D.N.M. 1995). 
 162 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 163 See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408 (1974)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (recognizing that the wearing of black armbands 
to protest the Vietnam War was protected speech). 
 164 See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (discussing Chalifoux v. 
New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997)). 
 165 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1305 
(8th Cir. 1997) (challenged dress code stated that “[g]ang related activities such as 
display of ‘colors’, symbols, signals, signs, etc., will not be tolerated on school grounds”); 
Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 664 (challenged school dress code prohibited “gang-related 
apparel” such as “[o]versized apparel, including baggy pants which are worn low on the 
waist”); Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 558 (challenged dress code prohibited the wearing of 
sagging pants); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (C.D. 
Cal. 1993) (challenged school dress code provided that “[c]lothes shall be sufficient to 
conceal undergarments at all times”). 
 166 City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 167 Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1236-37 (D.N.M. 2000). For a 
discussion of the First Amendment claim in this case, see infra note 188 and 
accompanying text. 
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justifying a patdown search.168 As these examples illustrate, the 
government clearly finds that the dress of gang members has a 
communicative element, or there would be no inference of gang 
membership from the wearing of clothes. Christopher M. 
LaVigne makes the same point in his analysis of the Chalifoux 
decision: 
School boards have justified prohibitions on gang-related apparel 
because of the threat of violence between rival gangs. For this threat 
of violence truly to exist, the [gang] symbols must be understood by 
those who view them. If individuals cannot comprehend the message 
of these symbols, or if one gang member cannot ascertain the 
affiliation of another gang member based upon what they are 
wearing, why bother regulating the symbols? It stretches credibility 
for the state to argue that this form of symbolic speech needs to be 
suppressed because of the danger the message presents, and then to 
turn around and argue that these symbols are not even speech 
because there is no identifiable message.169 
3. The Government Interest in Prohibiting Saggy Pants 
A detailed evaluation of the governmental interest 
justifying a saggy pants ordinance is difficult in the context of 
this Note’s generalized treatment of the issue across 
jurisdictions. However, a few interests emerge as likely 
justifications based on local officials’ statements. It bears 
repeating that this Note’s scope is confined to the 
constitutionality of saggy pants laws as they apply to a person 
who is not revealing any flesh whatsoever, but merely has 
visible undergarments above the waistband of the wearer’s 
pants or shorts. 
The most common justification for outlawing saggy 
pants is combating indecency and immorality, i.e., that society 
should be shielded from the sight of exposed underwear.170 
  
 168 State of Oregon v. Miglavs, 90 P.3d 607, 612-13 (Or. 2004) (“[A] particular 
style of attire may be a circumstance that, when considered in the overall context or 
totality of the circumstances of a police-citizen contact, contributes to the 
reasonableness of an officer’s safety assessment.”). For a broader treatment of the 
problems of racial profiling by police, see Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of 
African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439 (2004) and Suzin Kim, Note, Gangs and Law Enforcement: 
The Necessity of Limiting the Use of Gang Profiles, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 265 (1996).  
 169 Christopher M. LaVigne, Comment, Bloods, Crips, and Christians: 
Fighting Gangs or Fighting the First Amendment, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 409-10 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
 170 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 2 (quoting the sponsor of a proposed ordinance 
in Opa-locka, Fla., referring to sagging as “not decent”); Lacour, supra note 7 (reporting 
that the sponsor of the defeated ordinance in Charlotte, NC, said its purpose was to 
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Other asserted interests include economic development,171 
improving the job prospects and character of local youth,172 and 
discouraging criminality.173 
At first blush, saggy pants laws might seem to be 
content-neutral regulations of conduct, thus making the 
O’Brien test’s intermediate scrutiny apply.174 In Barnes v. 
Playtime Theaters, Inc., a plurality opinion of the Supreme 
Court said that indecent exposure laws are content-neutral, as 
they are justified by society’s interest in order and morality, 
rather than the suppression of free expression.175 However, a 
majority of the Court has never held that morality alone was 
an interest that justified the suppression of speech.176 Along 
these lines, the Court has deemed a facially content-based 
zoning law that regulated only the location of adult movie 
theaters to be content-neutral because it was justified by the 
content-neutral desire to control the “secondary effects” of such 
theaters, such as crime and reductions in property values and 
quality of life.177 Thus, cities with saggy pants ordinances might 
  
make sure “clothing didn’t [violate] standards of decency”); Mickle, supra note 46, at 1 
(quoting the Flint, Mich., police chief as referring to saggy pants as “immoral self-
expression”). 
 171 Editorial, Saggy Pants Shouldn’t Throw Village for a Loop, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, July 22, 2008, at 21 (noting that Lynwood, Il., village officials hope that a saggy 
pants ordinance “will help attract major retailers and boost economic development” by 
discouraging saggers); Hollinshed, Baggy Pants, supra note 42 (“Officials said one 
reason for the ordinance was that saggy pants gave potential developers a bad 
impression of the city.”). 
 172 Hollinshed, supra note 42 (noting that the police force of Pine Lawn, 
Missouri, is explaining to the public that “saggy pants could hurt someone’s chances of 
getting a job”); Bellantoni, supra note 35 (noting that the sponsor of the defeated saggy 
pants bill in Virginia said he wanted to improve the character of young persons 
wearing saggy pants); Parker, supra note 2 (characterizing the saggy pants laws 
movement as “fueled by growing worries among lawmakers that sloppy dress by 
America’s youth could be related, no matter how indirectly, to delinquency, poor 
learning, and crime.”). 
 173 See, e.g., William Lee, Village Cracks Down on Exposed Undies, CHICAGO 
SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at 18 (stating that the proposal for a saggy pants ordinance 
in Midlothian, Il., was “fueled by residents’ concerns that sagging pants is indicative of 
a gang problem in the village”); Ben Schmitt, ACLU Prepares to Take Cops to Court 
over Saggy Pants, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 21, 2008 (reporting that the police chief 
in Flint, Mich., said enforcing the city’s disorderly conduct ordinance against saggers 
can give police probable cause to search for evidence of other crimes such as weapon or 
drug possession). 
 174 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 175 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 176 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970 
(16th ed. 2007). 
 177 Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986); see also City 
of Erie v. PAP’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000) (plurality opinion) (using “secondary 
effects” analysis). 
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claim that prohibiting sagging is justified by combating the 
evils of indecency, as well as alleged secondary effects like 
criminality and reduced retail trade. However, a closer analysis 
reveals that such laws are content-based because they subject 
only one type of message to penalty: visible underwear is 
illegal, but visible swim trunks or shorts covering the same 
area are legal. 
Under the O’Brien test’s intermediate scrutiny, in order 
for the restriction on speech to be upheld, the asserted 
governmental interest must be substantial or important and 
the means chosen to promote that interest must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral 
interests.”178 While the governmental interest in preventing 
public nudity is undoubtedly substantial,179 the same argument 
does not carry over to the mere sight of underwear. Underwear 
which obscures all flesh is no different than shorts or swim 
trunks, which cover the same area. In reality, the government 
interest in prohibiting saggy pants is in combating the “idea” of 
underwear, not the sight of flesh. The “important” government 
interest behind saggy pants laws is in dictating the fashion 
choices of the citizenry, not in prohibiting public nudity. Hence, 
the government interest is related to the suppression of 
expression. Even if a court found such laws to be content-
neutral, the under-inclusive nature of saggy pants laws, which 
prohibit underwear but not shorts or swimwear, indicates that 
such laws are not closely tailored to the government interest, 
thus failing the O’Brien test. 
With regard to the secondary effects argument, the 
shortcomings of “narrow tailoring” are magnified. A city would 
be hard-pressed to find evidentiary support180 for any secondary 
effects of saggy pants, much less a link between visible 
  
 178 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).  
 179 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568-72 (plurality opinion). 
 180 Under the secondary effects analysis of Renton and City of Erie, some 
modicum of evidentiary support is needed to tie the harmful secondary effects to the 
expressive conduct. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion) (“In terms of 
demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not ‘conduct new 
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities’ to 
demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, ‘so long as whatever evidence the city 
relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city 
addresses.’” (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986))); see 
also id. at 310-16 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the 
plurality for upholding the ban on nude dancing when “the record before us today is 
deficient in its failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either for 
the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy”). 
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underwear and a lack of economic development. It strains 
credulity to imagine a relationship between visible underwear 
and criminality.181 Prohibiting sagging in public would not seem 
a closely tailored mechanism to improve the citizenry’s 
performance at job interviews.  
As anti-sagging laws can only be truly justified by a 
government interest in suppressing the indecent and offensive 
message that displaying one’s underwear expresses, strict 
scrutiny should apply. Strict scrutiny by the courts will mean 
that the saggy pants ordinance will survive only if it is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.182 As just discussed, even under 
the more relaxed intermediate scrutiny of the O’Brien test, it is 
doubtful whether a city could establish an “important” 
government interest justifying a ban on saggy pants, much less 
show that such laws are closely tailored to the interest. 
Therefore, it is hard to see how a saggy pants ordinance would 
pass the “most exacting scrutiny”183 given to content-based 
regulations of speech.  
Under strict scrutiny, saggy pants ordinances should be 
easily invalidated, as the Supreme Court has made abundantly 
clear that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.”184 The First Amendment places 
the burden on the offended public, rather than the offensive 
speaker.185 More concretely, as between ignoring the offense 
  
 181 Note that mere membership in a gang or otherwise being a gangster is not 
a crime, absent a violation of some other substantive law. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451, 457 (1939). 
 182 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988); Perry Ed. Ass’n. v. 
Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 
461 (1980). 
 183 Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. 
 184 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also, e.g., Police Dep’t of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) 
(“[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may 
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”). 
 185 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (reversing the conviction of 
a man arrested for wearing a jacket in a courthouse bearing the words “Fuck the 
Draft”: “[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve 
automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense. While this Court 
has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit 
intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be 
totally banned from the public dialogue, we have at the same time consistently stressed 
that we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
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received by some viewers of saggy pants and affirmatively 
prohibiting sagging, the Framers of the Constitution have 
foreclosed the public’s choice in the matter.186 Accordingly, 
saggy pants ordinances should be found to violate the First 
Amendment’s protection of free speech. 
The outcome of a First Amendment claim, however, is 
by no means certain. The potential hazards of a strictly applied 
Spence test187 could leave litigants wholly outside the 
protections of the First Amendment if a court finds sagging not 
to be expressive conduct.188 Indeed, several courts have held 
that restrictions on clothing choices do not implicate the First 
Amendment. For example, in Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 
New York, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied a claim 
that a uniform policy prohibiting a government employee from 
wearing a skirt to work violated the First Amendment.189 The 
Zalewska court said that while wearing a skirt is “expressive,” 
“it does not constitute the type of expressive conduct which 
would allow her to invoke the First Amendment in challenging 
the county’s regulation because the ordinary viewer would 
glean no particularized message from . . . wearing a skirt 
rather than pants as part of her uniform.”190 Similarly, in Hodge 
v. Lynd, a federal district court in New Mexico found that the 
police did not implicate the free speech rights of a county fair 
patron who was excluded from the fair for wearing a 
backwards-facing baseball cap with no words or symbols.191 
  
objectionable speech. The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to 
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent 
upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially 
intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a 
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections” (internal 
citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 186 Cf. id. (referring to the offended viewers of Cohen’s jacket: “[t]hose in the 
Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their 
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”). 
 187 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see supra Part II.B.1. 
 188 There is certainly language in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to 
support such a finding. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is 
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-
for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall-but 
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept 
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”). 
 189 Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, New York, 316 F.3d 314, 319-21 (2d Cir. 
2003). For a discussion of the due process claim brought in this case, see infra notes 
228-229 and accompanying text. 
 190 Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 320.  
 191 Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1237-38 (D.N.M. 2000).  
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Even passing this initial hurdle of establishing sagging as 
symbolic conduct will still require demonstrating that the 
regulation fails either the O’Brien test or strict scrutiny.192 
Thus, the potential difficulties of a First Amendment challenge 
to saggy pants ordinances means that challengers should also 
assert violations of the Due Process Clause’s protections of 
individual liberty. 
III. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE 
Saggy pants laws also implicate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of an individual’s liberty. Because 
they regulate what citizens may or may not wear, saggy pants 
ordinances may violate a liberty interest in personal 
appearance protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.193 Part III surveys the case law 
pertinent to the application of this constitutional right in the 
context of laws banning saggy pants, and concludes that 
prohibiting saggy pants is not rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.  
A. The Due Process Liberty Interest Legal Landscape 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, 
“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”194 Due process entails two 
separate limitations on government power: procedural due 
process and substantive due process.195 Procedural due process 
refers to the procedures to be used before a person may be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property.196 In addition, the Supreme 
Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause also restricts the substance of governmental 
  
 192 See supra Part II.B.3. 
 193 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 194 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 195 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring); see generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545-48 (3d ed. 2006). 
 196 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (holding that the 
government must conduct a hearing before termination of welfare benefits); see 
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 195, at 545-604. 
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regulation, and requires the government to have an adequate 
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property.197 
Substantive due process refers to the notion that some 
individual liberties are so important to the concept of freedom 
that, although not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, 
they are deemed to be “fundamental rights” which the 
government cannot infringe unless strict scrutiny is met.198 For 
example, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents have 
a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their 
children, and termination of custody rights requires a 
compelling government purpose, such as preventing child 
abuse.199 If a court recognizes a liberty interest, but finds that 
the right is not fundamental, generally the government must 
only have some rational basis for passing the law which 
infringes upon the right, i.e. the law or regulation must have a 
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.200  
There is no bright-line rule for determining what 
substantive rights are protected by the Due Process Clause,201 
  
 197 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding a state ban on 
abortions unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding a ban on 
interracial marriages unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(holding a state ban on the teaching of foreign languages to children unconstitutional). 
Aside from the analysis of substantive due process rights in the context of individual 
civil rights contained herein, there is an earlier line of cases concerning substantive 
due process in the context of economic liberties. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a law which limited the number of hours 
bakers could work as violating liberty of contract). This “economic liberties” line of 
cases was later abandoned. See, e.g.,Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 
(1955) (“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and 
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony 
with a particular school of thought.”); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).. 
 198 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746, 753 (1982) (recognizing that 
“freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” and specifically finding that “[t]he 
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management 
of their child” was implicated by the case); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(recognizing the right to marry as a fundamental right protected under the Due 
Process Clause). 
 199 See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-
58 (1972). 
 200 See, e.g., Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488 (“It is enough that there is an evil at 
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative 
measure was a rational way to correct it.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (“The 
established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of 
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”). 
 201 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due 
process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by 
reference to any code.”). 
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but the Supreme Court has emphasized that fundamental 
rights are those which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”202 For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the 
Court set forth its conception: 
Without doubt, [due process] denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, 
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.203 
The liberty interest in controlling one’s personal 
appearance has been repeatedly invoked by litigants in due 
process challenges to dress codes, with varying success. In the 
1960s and 1970s, numerous students and teachers challenged 
hair length and beard restrictions in the public schools,204 and 
courts took widely divergent positions on the issue. For 
example, in Richards v. Thurston, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the suspension of a student for refusing to 
cut his hair violated the student’s personal liberty as protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
was unjustified absent unclean hair.205 In Breen v. Kahl, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that “[t]he right to 
wear one’s hair at any length or in any desired manner” was a 
“fundamental right” protected by either the First or Ninth 
  
 202 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 203 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. To the extent the casual reader might literally 
construe “freedom from bodily restraint” to protect the wearer of saggy pants from 
being forced to apply a belt, this language refers to the fact that prisoners and those 
involuntarily committed to mental institutions are by definition deprived of liberty and 
are thus accorded procedural due process protections. See generally CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 195, at 566-67. 
 204 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wheeler County, Ga., 426 F.2d 1154, 
1158 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming suspension of students for refusal to shave based on 
evidence that “a failure to shave is a departure from the norm which has a diverting 
influence on the student body”); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 
1970) (holding that suspension of a high school student for refusing to cut his hair 
violated due process); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217-18 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(affirming suspension of long-haired students from due process and First Amendment 
challenges); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that 
students’ right to wear long hair is fundamental and could only be abridged by showing 
long hair disrupted the educational process). For an in-depth treatment of the long hair 
and grooming cases, see Recent Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1702-04 & n.4 (1971). 
 205 Thurston, 424 F.2d at 1285-86. 
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Amendments,206 which could not be abridged without a showing 
of a “substantial justification.”207 On the other end of the 
spectrum, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferrell v. 
Dallas Independent School District upheld a school regulation 
banning long hair from First Amendment and due process 
challenges, due to the “compelling” state interest in 
“maintaining an effective and efficient school system.”208 The 
Supreme Court never took up the issue of whether schools may 
restrict the personal appearance of students and teachers, 
despite the circuit split.209 
The only time the Supreme Court has decided a case in 
which a litigant asserted a due process liberty interest in 
personal appearance, the Court assumed without deciding that 
such a right did in fact exist.210 In Kelley v. Johnson, a 
policeman challenged the validity of a hair grooming regulation 
for the male members of the Suffolk County, New York police 
force on both free speech and due process grounds.211 The 
regulation contained restrictions on the style and length of 
hair, sideburns, and moustaches, and banned beards and 
goatees unless medically necessary.212 The Court assumed, for 
the purposes of deciding the case against the policeman, that 
  
 206 The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 207 Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036. 
 208 Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1968). In 
Domico v. Rapides Parish School Board, 675 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals later held that there was a due process liberty interest in the 
freedom to choose one’s hairstyle. 
 209 At least twice, Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari of a 
long-hair case. In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 U.S. 856, 856 
(1968), he noted: 
[A] nation bent on turning out robots might insist that every male have a 
crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of “life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness,” expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later 
found specific definition in the Constitution itself, including of course freedom 
of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had supposed those guarantees 
permitted idiosyncrasies to flourish, especially when they concern the image 
of one’s personality and his philosophy toward government and his fellow 
men. 
In Olff v. East Side Union High School District, 404 U.S. 1042, 1042-46 (1972), Justice 
Douglas characterized the situation as one where “[t]he federal courts are in conflict 
and the decisions in disarray,” and found it “incredible that under our federalism a 
State can deny a student education in its public school system unless his hair style 
comports with the standards of the school board.” 
 210 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976). 
 211 Id. at 239-41. 
 212 Id. at 239-40. 
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“the citizenry at large has some sort of ‘liberty’ interest within 
the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal 
appearance.”213 The Court used a rational basis standard of 
review, explaining that “the constitutional issue to be 
decided . . . is whether [the county’s] determination that such 
regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be 
branded ‘arbitrary,’ and therefore a deprivation of [the 
policeman’s] ‘liberty’ interest in freedom to choose his own 
hairstyle.”214 The Court found that there was a rational 
connection between the grooming regulations and promoting 
public safety, as the regulations fostered similarity in 
appearance of police officers, which made officers more easily 
recognized by the public and helped inculcate an esprit de corps 
in the police force.215 
However, the Kelley ruling explicitly noted the 
significance of Johnson’s status as a police officer and 
government employee.216 The Court explained that the 
regulation “cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather must be 
considered in the context of the county’s chosen mode of 
organization for its police force.”217 The Court distinguished 
claims by “the citizenry at large” from employees of the police 
department, calling the distinction “highly significant.”218 It 
analogized to a case dealing with the free speech rights of 
government employees, and said that “the State has interests 
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that 
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with 
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”219 The 
Court discounted any suggestion that a claim by a government 
employee asserting a liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment “must necessarily be treated . . . the same as a 
similar claim by a member of the general public.”220  
In addition, Justice Thurgood Marshall strongly 
dissented from the majority opinion in Kelley, and was joined 
  
 213 Id. at 244. 
 214 Id. at 247-48. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 244-45. 
 217 Id. at 247. 
 218 Id. at 244-45. 
 219 Id. at 245 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 220 Id. at 248-49. 
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by Justice William Brennan.221 They believed “it [is] clear that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed protect against 
comprehensive regulation of what citizens may or may not 
wear,” and found the county’s justifications lacking.222 Marshall 
said to deny a liberty interest in matters of personal 
appearance “would be fundamentally inconsistent with the 
values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal 
integrity that . . . the Constitution was designed to protect.”223 
Justice Marshall referenced historical instances of 
authoritarian governments regulating the personal appearance 
of their citizens, such as Peter the Great’s “beard tax” in Russia 
and Libya’s threat to draft long-haired youths into the army, 
saying, “It is inconceivable to me that the Constitution would 
offer no protection whatsoever against the carrying out of 
similar actions by either our Federal or State Governments.”224 
Since Kelley, courts adjudicating challenges to 
regulations of personal appearance have followed its rationale, 
giving deference to the government’s interest in regulating the 
appearance of government employees.225 Courts have held that 
teachers may be fired for wearing skirts too short,226 or 
reprimanded for refusing to wear neckties,227 because of the 
schools’ rational interest in “promoting respect for authority 
and traditional values, as well as discipline in the classroom, 
by requiring teachers to dress in a professional manner.”228 
Police officers may constitutionally be reprimanded for wearing 
  
 221 Id. at 249-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Lewis Powell 
wrote a concurring opinion to stress that the majority opinion did not hold that there 
was no liberty interest in personal appearance, and noted that the regulation at issue 
was justifiably applied to a police force, but “would be an impermissible intrusion upon 
liberty in a different context.” Id. at 249 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 222 Id. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 223 Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 224 Id. at 253-54 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 225 See infra notes 226-232 and accompanying text. 
 226 Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 763-64 (1st Cir. 1976). In Tardif, the First 
Circuit noted:  
[W]e are not dealing with personal appearance in what might be termed an 
individual sense, but in a bilateral sense a contractual relationship. 
Whatever constitutional aspect there may be to one’s choice of apparel 
generally, it is hardly a matter which falls totally beyond the scope of the 
demands which an employer, public or private, can legitimately make upon 
its employees. 
Id. at 763. 
 227 East Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 
863 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
 228 Id. at 859. 
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earrings, regardless of whether the ear studs are worn on or off 
duty.229 A uniform policy requiring county-employed “Meals on 
Wheels” van drivers to wear pants was upheld when an 
employee was suspended for insisting on wearing a skirt.230 The 
court found a rational basis for the regulation in the “safety 
problem” that skirts may pose to employees operating 
wheelchair lifts.231  
On the other hand, courts have conducted a more 
searching inquiry into the purported rationales for dress 
regulations affecting the general public. The Supreme Court of 
Illinois held that a Chicago ordinance prohibiting a person 
from wearing clothing of the opposite sex with intent to conceal 
his or her sex was unconstitutional as applied to two 
transsexuals adopting a female lifestyle in anticipation of 
sexual reassignment operations.232 The Illinois Supreme Court 
found the city’s twin justifications of discouraging crime and 
protecting public morals unsupported by any evidence linking 
cross-dressing with criminality or harm to society.233  
In DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals struck down a Palm Beach, Florida ordinance 
that prohibited appearing in public without a covering on the 
upper part of the body, after a male jogger who preferred to jog 
shirtless sued on due process grounds.234 The town’s two 
justifications, stabilizing property values and maintaining 
Palm Beach’s history, tradition, identity, and quality of life, 
were found to be not rationally related to shirtless jogging by 
males.235 The DeWeese Court suggested that regulation of the 
dress of citizens at large “is simply not a legitimate 
governmental interest,” and that the jogger’s case was 
indistinguishable from hypothetical laws requiring all citizens 
to wear brown shirts or prohibiting women from appearing in 
public in slacks or with bare calves—“[w]e are satisfied that 
such intrusions on the liberty interests of citizens at large 
  
 229 Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 230 Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2003). 
For a discussion of the First Amendment claim brought in this case, see supra notes 
187-188 and accompanying text.  
 231 Id. 
 232 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524-25 (Il. 1978). 
 233 Id. For a general discussion of the history of sumptuary laws banning 
cross-dressing and the role of dress and appearance in criminal law, see Bennett 
Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2008). 
 234 DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 235 Id. at 1367-68. 
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would not pass constitutional muster, absent identification of 
some rational basis which has not yet been brought to our 
attention and which is beyond our present imagination.”236 
However, on at least one occasion, the liberty interest in 
personal appearance by the public at large has been 
subordinated to a state interest.237 In Williams v. Kleppe, 
decided shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelley v. 
Johnson, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a National 
Park Service regulation prohibiting nude sunbathing at a 
remote beach in Cape Cod Seashore National Park.238 Brush 
Hollow beach, at which skinny-dipping had been tolerated for 
nearly fifty years, eventually grew so popular that it attracted 
up to 1200 sunbathers a day.239 According to the court, the 
government’s interest in preventing environmental damage to 
the beach resulting from Brush Hollow’s increased popularity 
justified the regulation.240 
B. Due Process and Saggy Pants Ordinances 
As a preliminary matter, the freedom to make decisions 
regarding one’s personal appearance would seem to be “deeply 
rooted within this Nation’s history and tradition.”241 Indeed, 
during the 1789 congressional debates over the Bill of Rights, it 
was assumed to exist.242 When debating whether the right of 
assembly should be included in the First Amendment, some 
Framers argued that it was superfluous to expressly mention a 
right of assembly because it was so clear that such a right 
could not be restricted by the government.243 Congressman 
Egbert Benson of New York argued for expressly mentioning 
the right in order to assure that it would never be infringed.244 
Congressman Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts replied: 
If the committee were governed by that general principle . . . they 
might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat 
if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed 
  
 236 Id. at 1369-70. 
 237 See, e.g., Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 238 Id. at 805-07. 
 239 Id. at 805. 
 240 Id. at 805-07. 
 241 The quoted language is from Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
503 (1977). 
 242 IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 54-55 (1965). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 54. 
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when he thought proper; but [I] would ask the gentleman whether 
he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of 
rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be 
infringed.245 
As Justice Thurgood Marshall later explained: 
Thus, while they did not include it in the Bill of Rights, Sedgwick 
and his colleagues clearly believed there to be a right in one’s 
personal appearance. And, while they may have regarded the right 
as a trifle as long as it was honored, they clearly would not have so 
regarded it if it were infringed.246 
Given this history, the Kelley Court’s assumption that 
the citizenry has a liberty interest in personal appearance,247 
and the fact that several Circuit Courts of Appeal have 
affirmed such a right,248 litigants challenging saggy pants 
ordinances should be able to establish the right (thus clearing 
the first hurdle in a substantive due process claim). However, 
no court has gone so far as to declare such a right to be 
“fundamental.” Accordingly, saggy pants laws will likely be 
given rational basis review, which means the laws must have a 
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.249 
Local government has a legitimate purpose if it advances a 
traditional police power such as protecting safety, public 
health, or public morals.250 However, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that a simple moral justification for a law may not 
always satisfy the requirement of a legitimate purpose.251 The 
  
 245 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 732 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The discussion took place 
in the House of Representatives on August 15, 1789. 
 246 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 252 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 247 Id. at 244 (majority opinion). 
 248 See Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting 
that “this circuit has held that choice of appearance is an element of liberty”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1367 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (declaring that whether such a right exists “is not an open question in this 
circuit”); Domico v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 675 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating 
that “there is a constitutional liberty interest in choosing how to wear one’s hair”); 
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1970) (invalidating a school’s 
hair length regulation on due process grounds). 
 249 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (explaining that “[i]f a 
legislative classification or distinction ‘neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets 
a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996))). 
 250 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (declaring that “[p]ublic safety, 
public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order . . . are some of the more conspicuous 
examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.”). 
 251 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado 
Constitutional amendment that repealed all laws protecting gays and lesbians from 
discrimination).  
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Court has said that “a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest,” as when Congress passed a law with 
the express purpose of denying food stamps to residents of 
hippie communes.252 Obviously, a purpose of infringing upon a 
constitutional right such as freedom of religion or the right to 
vote would not be legitimate.  
As noted above, while courts have generally deferred to the 
government’s rationale in regulating the appearance of students 
and government employees, no such deference has been given to 
equivalent restrictions on the general public.253 As the Supreme 
Court noted in Kelley, this distinction is “highly significant.”254 
Communities defending saggy pants ordinances will 
likely put forth rationales similar to those mentioned in the 
earlier discussion of the First Amendment issues surrounding 
saggy pants ordinances, namely combating indecency, 
discouraging criminality, improving the job prospects and 
character of local youth, and boosting economic development.255 
To these may be added rationales asserted by other cities 
regulating the general public dress, such as Palm Beach’s 
justifications for banning shirtless jogging in the DeWeese case: 
stabilizing property values and preserving the city’s history, 
tradition, identity, and quality of life.256 
None of these justifications appear to be rationally 
related to prohibiting saggy pants. The Supreme Court in 
Kelley explained that the issue is whether the law’s 
justification “is so irrational that it may be branded 
‘arbitrary.’”257 Regarding indecency, it may be irrational to ban 
the sight of an item of clothing whose purpose is to cover up the 
reproductive organs and buttocks. It is certainly arbitrary to 
  
 252 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer, 
517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 
27 (1985) (invalidating a law which had no purpose other than favoring residents of 
Vermont over nonresidents as not furthering a legitimate state interest); Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (declaring that a bare interest in favoring long-time 
Alaska residents over new residents was not a legitimate state interest). 
 253 See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text. 
 254 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1976); see also Richards v. 
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (“Once the personal liberty is shown, the 
countervailing interest must either be self-evident or be affirmatively shown.”). 
 255 See supra Part II.B.3. 
 256 DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 257 Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 845 (1998) (“We have emphasized time and again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government’ . . . .”). 
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ban underwear, but not shorts or swimwear, which cover the 
very same area.258 Similarly, there seems to be no relationship 
between wearing saggy pants and crime, other than the fact 
that some gangsters wear saggy pants. However, absent 
participation in an unlawful activity, being a gang member in 
and of itself is not a crime.259  
The other justifications for sagging ordinances also lack 
a rational relationship to outlawing saggy pants, apart from 
mere conclusory assertions that they do. Prohibiting saggy 
pants does not appear rationally related to improving the 
character and morality of local youth, much less improving 
their job prospects.260 It is hard to conceive of evidentiary 
support for a relationship between property values or a lack of 
economic development and saggy pants.261 Likewise, a local 
history or tradition of requiring citizens to maintain their 
pants at waist level would be hard to substantiate.262 
At bottom, it would appear the only justification for 
saggy pants ordinances is the city’s interest in regulating the 
personal appearance of its citizens to conform to the city’s 
taste. This, as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggested 
in DeWeese, “is simply not a legitimate governmental 
interest.”263 As the Supreme Court stated over a hundred years 
ago, “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual 
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”264 More recently, in his Kelley 
  
 258 Cf. supra Part II.B.3. 
 259 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457 (1939) (striking down a New 
Jersey statute making it a crime to be a gangster); see also Suzin Kim, Note, Gangs 
and Law Enforcement: The Necessity of Limiting the Use of Gang Profiles, 5 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 265, 281-82 (1996); N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-
20 (1982) (“The First Amendment . . . restricts the ability of the State to impose 
liability on an individual solely because of his association with another.”). 
 260 Cf. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (declaring 
that the court “see[s] no inherent reason why decency, decorum, or good conduct 
requires a boy to wear his hair short. Certainly eccentric hair styling is no longer a 
reliable signal of perverse behavior.”). 
 261 Cf. DeWeese, 812 F.2d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that property 
values were not rationally related to presence of shirtless joggers). 
 262 Cf. id. at 1367-68 (noting the lack of evidentiary support for a city’s 
“history or tradition requiring men to wear a shirt when toplessness is appropriate”). 
 263 Cf. id. at 1369. 
 264 Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also 
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) (“The right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ 
of which the citizen cannot be deprived . . . [i]t may be as close to the heart of the 
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.”). 
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dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that “[i]f little can 
be found in past cases of this Court or indeed in the Nation’s 
history on the specific issue of a citizen’s right to choose his 
own personal appearance, it is only because the right has been 
so clear as to be beyond question.”265  
Thus, saggy pants laws violate due process, as they 
strike at the very heart of each citizen’s liberty.266 A constitution 
which protects freedoms exercised only infrequently, such as 
voting or speaking out in dissent, surely should protect a 
citizen’s choice in daily attire. There is no self-evident 
justification for such laws aside from furthering a government 
interest in regulating the fashion choices of the public, which is 
not a legitimate, much less rational, use of the government’s 
power. It is an illegitimate use of the state’s police power if the 
only purpose for a law is to deny a right so “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition” that the Framers of the 
Constitution thought it self-evident that government could not 
infringe.267 If saggy pants laws do not violate due process, there 
would seem to be no principled distinction between anti-
sagging laws and hypothetical laws further down the slippery 
slope toward compelled national conformity in dress and 
hairstyle.268 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Saggy pants laws impinge upon two important 
constitutional rights, the First Amendment’s protection of free 
speech and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of individual 
liberties.269 Sagging, like all fashion choices, is expressive conduct 
intended to communicate aspects of our identity to passersby.270 
An individual’s right to free speech should not be limited to easily 
understandable or conventional speech, as human expression is 
  
 265 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 266 Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) )). 
 267 The quoted language is from Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
503 (1977). 
 268 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 253 & n.4 (“[I]t would be distressing, to say the 
least, if the government could regulate our personal appearance unconfined by any 
constitutional strictures whatsoever.”); see also supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 269 See supra Parts II and III, respectively. 
 270 See supra Part II.B.2. 
706 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2 
not similarly limited.271 The nature of the governmental interests 
asserted in defense of saggy pants laws are not substantial or 
narrowly-tailored enough to justify the intrusion upon the public’s 
self-autonomy and rights of expression.272 However, the potential 
shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s principal First Amendment 
test for defining expressive conduct suggest that the more 
promising avenue for potential litigants is under the Due Process 
Clause’s protections of individual liberty. 
Saggy pants ordinances impermissibly encroach upon the 
citizen’s right to liberty in matters of personal appearance.273 
Whatever may be the rationale for government restrictions on the 
dress of students and government employees, similar restrictions 
on the general public are an entirely different matter.274 There is 
no rational justification for saggy pants laws aside from a raw 
assertion that government has an interest in dictating the fashion 
choices of the citizenry.275 Such a bold intrusion on the very heart 
of personal freedom should not be countenanced in a system of 
government based on individual liberty. 
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